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Abstract 
Motivated by the literature on ‘competing principals’, this article studies the effect of interactive 
social networking sites on the behavior of politicians. For this purpose, 12,455 comments posted on 
the Facebook walls of 423 Italian MPs have been analyzed to assess whether Facebook played a 
role in the selection of the Italian Head of State in 2013, enhancing responsiveness. The statistical 
analysis reveals that the pressure exerted through social media did not affect MPs’ propensity to 
express public dissent over the party line, which is instead affected by more traditional ‘principals’ 
and factors: seniority, primary elections and factional membership. 
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Introduction 
The advent of interactive SNS has reopened the debate on whether the web can become an 
uncoerced public sphere (e.g., Dahlgren 2005) that enhances accountability and responsiveness. 
Indeed, due to their potential interactivity, SNS like Facebook and Twitter could favor participatory 
and transparent democracy (Avery and Graham 2013; Waters and Williams 2011), allowing citizens 
to play a role in the development of the democratic polity (Dahlgren 2005). 
So far, the literature has investigated whether the interactions that take place on SNS influence the 
attitudes and behavior of individual citizens (Bond et al. 2012; Effing, van Hillegersberg, and 
Huibers 2011; Kushin and Yamamoto 2010; Zhang et al. 2010). After the Arab Spring the role of 
SNS in undermining authoritarian regimes has also been widely studied (Howard and Parks 2012; 
Shirky 2011). Conversely, in democratic regimes, scholars have mainly paid attention to how online 
activism can influence public policy (for a review: Dekker and Bekkers 2015), while the effect of 
SNS on ‘politics’ (specifically, legislative politics) has been less investigated.  
Starting from the literature on ‘competing principals’ (e.g., Carey 2007; Sieberer 2015), the present 
paper attempts to fill this gap. The literature on legislative politics highlights that the party 
leadership is the first principal able to affect the behavior of MPs. However, depending on the 
institutional context, legislators can be influenced by other rival principals such as their 
constituency or factional leaders. In light of this, the interaction between politicians and SNS users 
that occurs on Web 2.0 platforms can expose MPs to pressure from such virtual public sphere, 
which can act as another ‘competing principal’ consisting of the audience of the politicians’ 
Facebook ‘friends’ (Scarrow 2015). 
SNS conversations allow users to directly express their opinions to the MP, who becomes aware of 
the ideas of his/her Facebook friends. In turn, this online interaction may enhance the 
responsiveness of MPs to activated public opinion. 
To assess whether parliamentary behavior can be affected by the power of Facebook, we focus on 
the selection of the Italian Head of State that took place in mid-April 2013. This election 
dramatically revealed the potential of SNS to exert pressure on MPs and led to a heated debate over 
whether the power of Facebook contributed to the failure of the candidacy of Franco Marini as 
Head of State.  
Many influential journalists, politicians, and political analysts such as Luca Sofri, Giuliano Ferrara, 
or Bruno Vespa argued that the pressure exerted through SNS by the PD rank-and-file on their 
elected officials led to the defeat of Marini (for a review of these comments: Chiusi 2013; Pennisi 
2013). For instance, Di Traglia and Geloni (2013) claimed that the PD fell under the fire of tweets 
and unprecedented spamming (with approximately 110,000 serial messages sent to the e-mail 
addresses of PD deputies). Roberto Cota, member of the Northern League, complained about the 
fact that the Head of State was being elected through Twitter. Prominent PD politicians agreed with 
this assessment: the former party leader Dario Franceschini observed that for the first time, the party 
had experienced the power of Facebook and Twitter as a source of influence in the political debate, 
and the behavior of the parliamentary party group selected through party primaries was affected by 
pressure from the voters exerted through SNS. Other PD politicians retained the same view arguing 
that, through Facebook and Twitter, MPs are in contact with the rank-and-file and therefore they are 
less autonomous than they used to be (Chiusi 2013). Stefano Fassina, who eventually became junior 
minister, expressed an even more negative judgment, as he claimed that, to preserve their 
credibility, the political class should not surrender to ultimatums coming from a dozen of tweets or 
a hundred ‘likes’ on Facebook, and he criticized those MPs that followed the messages of their 
Facebook friends because doing so meant that they were no longer part of the ‘ruling class’ and had 
simply become ‘followers’ of such vocal minority (Di Traglia and Geloni 2013). 
Not all the political analysts, however, shared the same view. Others emphasized that MPs, in fact, 
did not surrender to the pressure coming from the Web (Chiusi 2013; Sentimeter 2013; Zampa 
2013) as MPs did not took into consideration other candidates, such as Emma Bonino or Stefano 
Rodotà, whose approval on Facebook and Twitter was rather strong (Chiusi 2013; Sentimeter 
2013). As a consequence, their choice to boycott the candidacy of Franco Marini could have been 
driven by other factors. 
The present paper sheds light on this puzzle. While the Head of State is elected by secret ballot, we 
will focus on the expression of public dissent to investigate the determinants of party unity. Using a 
novel and original dataset constructed by gathering the data available on SNS, we analyze 12,455 
comments published on the Facebook walls of 423 Italian MPs. Based on these comments, we 
assess the degree of pressure placed on MPs belonging to the Democratic Party by Internet users 
who opposed Marini, measured as the number of Facebook messages posted to criticize this choice.  
In so doing, we will evaluate whether this pressure affected an MP’s likelihood to express public 
dissent against the candidacy of Marini, while controlling for a number of potentially confounding 
factors and alternative explanations provided by the literature on legislative behavior (Carey 2007; 
Curini, Marangoni and Tronconi 2011; Eggers and Spirling 2014; Kam 2009; Sieberer 2015; Tavits 
2009) and intra-party dissent (Bernauer and Braüninger 2009; Ceron 2015a; Giannetti and Laver 
2009; Haber 2015; Spirling and Quinn 2010). 
The results of our statistical analysis reveal that SNS pressure did not increase an MP’s likelihood 
of expressing public dissent, which was instead affected by elements that traditionally affect party 
cohesion in parliamentary votes, such as experience, the selection of legislators through primary 
elections, and affiliation with a minority faction. 
Notably, due to the substantial pressure exerted through SNS in 2013, this context represents the 
most likely case for finding evidence of an effect of SNS. In turn, it represents a stringent test for 
hypotheses concerning the lack of Internet effects. Even in a favorable environment we did not find 
any SNS effect. Accordingly, we can reasonably expect to observe the lack of any SNS effect even 
under less favorable conditions. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 summarizes the literature on social media and politics. 
Section 2 discusses the role of SNS as a competing principal and offers corresponding hypotheses. 
Section 3 introduces the political context in April 2013, when the Parliament had to select the 
President. Section 4 describes the measurement of the dependent and independent variables. Section 
5 reports the results of the analysis. Section 6 concludes. 
 
Social Media and Politics in Italy (and Beyond) 
The role of social media in politics is a highly debated topic in Italy (e.g., Bentivegna 2014) as this 
country represents – for several reasons – a critical case. As a matter of fact, Italy ranks at the top 
levels for trust in the Internet.
1
 Furthermore, both the current Prime Minister, Matteo Renzi (leader 
of the Democratic Party), and the main opposition party (Five Stars Movement) have built their 
fortunes on the use of the Internet and emphasize the role of the web as a source to promote 
political participation. As a consequence, several scholars have analyzed SNS to study Italian 
electoral campaigns (Ceron and d’Adda 2015; Iannelli and Giglietto 2015; Vaccari et al. 2013) or 
Italian leaders (Ceron et al. 2014; Vaccari and Valeriani 2015). Focusing on Italy, many other 
studies investigated the link between SNS and public policy (Ceron and Negri 2016), political trust 
(Ceron 2015b; Monti et al. 2013) or political news (Ceron, Curini, and Iacus 2016; Giglietto and 
Selva 2014). 
In Italy and outside Italy, the literature on social media and politics has mainly investigated the 
topics described above, focusing on electoral campaigns and electoral forecasts or analyzing the 
effect of online activism on public policy, though citizen-initiated online participation has been 
understudied (Dekker and Bekkers 2015, 9; Ceron and Negri 2016). Apart from agenda-setting 
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 See for instance: www.lavoce.info/archives/39466/linformazione-attendibile-per-gli-italiani-e-in-
rete/ 
studies (e.g., Bekkers et al. 2011), little attention has been devoted to the effect of SNS on ‘politics’, 
rather than ‘policy’ and to the interaction between politicians and citizens. 
In recent years, however, the growth in the use of social media has created a wide online audience 
and has made the web attractive to parties and candidates. As a consequence, a growing number of 
politicians are now active on social networking sites (SNS) to communicate with citizens or reach 
new voters;
2
 such online interaction can dramatically alter citizens-elite communication (Ecker 
2015; Gainous and Wagner 2014; Parmelee and Bichard 2012) and deserves further investigation.  
It has been argued that this relationship could be asymmetrical and unidirectional if politicians are 
primarily interested in spreading their message and rely on a top-down style of communication, 
looking at citizens more as ‘followers’ than as ‘friends’ (Larsson 2013; Sæbo 2011).  
The interactive nature of SNS, however, makes it difficult to ignore another person’s opinions. 
Given that SNS allow voters to dialogue online with their representatives (Mackay 2010), 
politicians are ultimately exposed to citizens’ viewpoints and to the changing climate of opinion 
broadcast by other SNS users (Graham, Jackson, and Broersma 2014). Indeed, recent studies attest a 
growth in the online interaction between politicians and citizens (Graham et al. 2013; Larsson and 
Ihlen 2015), which is perceived by citizens as real interpersonal contact and conversation (Lee and 
Jang 2011).  
 
Competing Principals in the Age of SNS: Literature and Hypotheses 
We know that the online behavior is publicly observable, therefore politicians may be affected by 
the need to display loyalty to preserve party unity and avoid being punished by the party leadership. 
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 Today, more than 75% of Italian MPs have a Facebook account. This number increased by 
approximately 40 points in the last four years. 
As such, they could decide to act in accordance with the party line and broadcast content that is 
coherent with it. 
However, SNS provide them with the extraordinary opportunity to communicate directly with 
voters. On the one hand, politicians can spread messages tailored to their supporters with a content 
that differs from the official party line, particularly in contexts where intra-party competition 
provides incentives to do so (Adi, Erickson, and Lilleker 2014; Skovsgaard and Van Dalen 2013; 
Vergeer, Hermans, and Sams 2013). On the other hand, as long as politicians are exposed to the 
opinions expressed on SNS (Graham, Jackson, and Broersma 2014), they can feel a pressure to 
conform to such opinions in order to make citizens and voters happy. Indeed, when politicians 
engage with voters their evaluations can improve and politicians can get some electoral benefits 
(Grant, Moon, and Grant 2010; Vergeer and Hermans, 2013). 
The importance of interacting on SNS is even more crucial in light of the recent change in the 
organization of political parties. To explain such change, Scarrow (2015) introduced the concept of 
‘Multi‐Speed membership’ highlighting that nowadays parties are composed of multiple categories 
of affiliates. In order to respond to the membership decline, parties blurred the boundaries between 
members and ‘self‐identified supporters’ (those who want some kind of party contact but are not 
interested in formal membership) allowing such networks of ‘friends’ and ‘followers’ to participate 
in intra-party decision-making (Scarrow 2015). The interactive Web 2.0 plays a key role in this 
process. Indeed, ‘friends’ and ‘followers’ use SNS to freely join a party‐led communication 
network and to interact with politicians. On the one hand, citizens receive party messages via 
Twitter or Facebook (Vaccari and Valeriani 2015). On the other, they have the opportunity to speak 
back by commenting on texts posted by politicians or by sending them direct messages (Scarrow 
2015). In light of this, SNS can be viewed as a new ‘competing principal’ with which politician 
have to deal.  
Research Question 1 (RQ1): Does the interaction with the opinions of ‘friends’ and ‘followers’ 
affect the behavior of politicians? 
 
The literature on legislative behavior points to the relevance of the party leadership, which sets the 
party line and is the first and foremost principal responsible for ensuring that the parliamentary 
behavior of MPs will conform to that line. When the individual career of each MP primarily 
depends on the support of the leadership, or when an MP requires the leader’s aid to realize a goal 
(e.g., be re-elected, pass a law or be appointed to office), we can expect to observe a higher degree 
of loyalty toward the party line. The same outcome is observed when MPs closely share the 
leadership’s ideological position or when the leader is stronger and able to impose discipline (e.g., 
through sanctions) even on reluctant MPs. 
Beside the party leadership, however, the literature underlined the existence of many other 
‘competing principals’ (e.g. Carey 2007; Sieberer 2015). Scholars highlighted that important 
sources of loyalty and dissent are linked with the electoral system (e.g., Carey 2007; Curini, 
Marangoni, and Tronconi 2011; Sieberer 2015; Tavits 2009), the intra-party structure (Bernauer and 
Braüninger 2009; Ceron 2015a; Giannetti and Laver 2009; Haber 2015; Spirling and Quinn 2010) 
or personal characteristics of the MP such as expertise (Eggers and Spirling 2014). Depending on 
the institutional and electoral contexts and on the organizational structure of the party, MPs can 
directly rely on the consent of voters to be re-elected and improve their status. Alternatively, in 
internally divided parties, MPs may rely on the support of their factional leader, who trades rewards 
for loyalty. Thus, in addition to the party leadership, MPs can also be exposed to the demands of 
their constituency or intra-party faction, which may conflict with the party line. 
After the change in party organization discussed above, the advent of interactive SNS can extend 
the concept of ‘competing principals’ further. Online public opinion can represent an additional 
competing principal beyond the party leadership and the MP’s faction or constituency. The users of 
SNS can provide the MP with resources such as their network of contacts, which can enhance the 
MP’s visibility at little or no cost (Gueorguieva 2008; Vergeer, Hermans, and Sams 2013), and their 
own support, which can translate into online popularity provided that several users support the MP 
in online conversations. 
In turn, online popularity can imply media popularity whenever the MP becomes sufficiently 
famous online that mass media begin to provide him/her with coverage in more traditional channels 
such as television or newspapers. For the same reasons, an MP should be concerned by negative 
online popularity and should have an incentive to avoid instances in which the users of SNS give 
him/her negative exposure. 
Finally, the SNS audience can also become a potential source of information for micro-targeting, 
fundraising and online campaigning (Gueorguieva 2008; Vergeer, Hermans, and Sams 2013). In 
summary, for all of the abovementioned reasons, an MP could be interested in cultivating a positive 
relationship with his/her SNS audience (Grant, Moon, and Grant 2010; Vergeer and Hermans 2013) 
and consider their demands, particularly those that are more salient for the audience. Accordingly, 
MPs will become increasingly responsive as the pressure placed on them by their Facebook friends 
grows. 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): MPs exposed to higher levels of pressure from their Facebook friends are more 
likely to express dissent from the party line. 
 
Moreover, the SNS environment can become a useful tool that allows the MP to interact with a 
more traditional ‘principal’, i.e., his/her constituency of voters and rank-and-file members. Because 
MPs have an interest in being re-elected, they will behave according to the desires of those who can 
grant them the re-election. When the candidate selection process primarily depends on the support 
of their constituencies, MPs have an incentive to consider their requests and, in this context, SNS 
are useful for revealing the true preferences of voters and allowing the rank-and-file to have their 
voices heard. Provided that the MP can cultivate a direct relationship with his/her constituents 
through SNS, the incentive to cultivate personal loyalties to him/her among voters by heeding 
his/her constituents’ desires should increase the likelihood of expressing dissent from the party line, 
whenever this line diverges from the constituency’s stance. For instance, when MPs are selected 
through party primaries, they will become increasingly responsive to requests from SNS as the 
pressure placed on them by their Facebook friends grows, compared to cases in which the party 
leader has the final say on the party list. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): MPs exposed to higher levels of pressure from their Facebook friends are more 
likely to express dissent from the party line when they were selected through party primaries. 
 
The Selection of the Italian Head of State in 2013 and the Failure of Franco Marini: All 
because of Facebook? 
In April 2013, the renewed Italian parliament had to select a successor to Giorgio Napolitano as 
Head of State. In accordance with the Constitution, the election of the Head of State is the 
responsibility of a number of delegates, consisting of MPs (members of the Chamber of Deputies 
and senators) and representatives selected by the 20 Italian regions, who elect him/her by secret 
ballot.
3
 Through the third ballot, a qualified two-thirds majority is required; thereafter the Head of 
State can be selected by an absolute majority. In 2013, there were 1007 delegates, including 630 
deputies, 315 senators, 4 senators for life and 58 regional representatives (three per region except 
for the small Valle D’Aosta, which only sends one). The threshold required to elect the President in 
one of the first three ballots was 672 and fell to 504 beginning with the fourth ballot. 
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 Throughout the paper, for simplicity, we will use the terms MPs and delegates interchangeably. 
While reaching a qualified majority is already a difficult task, the astonishing results of the 2013 
Italian general election, in which no coalition won a majority of seats, further complicated the 
bargaining process. The center-left coalition only retained 493 delegates, a number insufficient to 
elect the new President, and hence it was crucial to compromise with rival parties. In an attempt to 
reach an agreement with the center-right coalition, the Democratic Party suggested the election of 
Franco Marini.  
Marini started his political career in the Christian Democracy (DC) and, after the dissolution of the 
DC, he became the leader of the Italian Popular Party, the centre-left heir of the DC. Marini has 
always retained policy positions in line with the catholic democratic tradition and, within the PD, he 
was considered one of the most moderate and influent politicians. As a moderate, he was deemed 
suitable to get elected by a wide majority after reaching a compromise with other parties.  
Although intended to establish an inter-party agreement with potential partners to surpass the 
threshold of votes required to elect the President, this choice was problematic and disputed at the 
intra-party level. The nomination of Marini, in fact, was also seen as an attempt to build a bridge 
between the centre-left PD and the centre-right People of Freedom (PDL), in order to form a Grosse 
Coalition including these two parties. Such Grosse Coalition would have overcome the political 
instability generated after the elections allowing the PD leadership to gain the premiership. 
Driven by personal career ambitions or by the will to halt the negotiation with the PDL, several 
senior politicians and rank-and-file members of the highly factionalized Democratic Party criticized 
the candidacy of Marini, and some factional leaders refused to endorse him. Matteo Renzi, head of 
the minority faction Renziani and destined to eventually become the party leader, was one such 
individual, and he argued that the election of Marini would have been damaging for the country. 
To resolve this dispute, on April 17
th
, the day before the first ballot, the party organized a meeting 
with all center-left delegates entitled to select the Head of State. The PD leader, Pierluigi Bersani, 
officially nominated Marini and demanded the support of the delegates, many of whom 
immediately refused to do so. In the heated debate that followed, several delegates declared their 
refusal to toe the party line, while others (including those belonging to the left-wing ally of the PD) 
left the room before a final decision was made. Simultaneously, several PD members, activists and 
sympathizers were protesting outside the building in which the meeting was held, and many others 
had already been mobilizing online through SNS over the preceding days to demonstrate their 
opposition to the Marini candidacy and to any other cooperation with the center-right. During the 
meeting, many delegates received numerous e-mails, SMS messages, or messages posted on 
Facebook and Twitter sent by rank-and-file members unwilling to accept Marini as the new 
President. This was only the tip of an iceberg of dissent, expressed both online (on SNS) and offline 
(by young PD members who occupied many local headquarters of the party), which had affected the 
party for a few days, i.e., beginning when Marini was first mentioned as a candidate and the idea of 
a ‘Grosse coalition’ between the center-left and the center-right was at stake. 
Ultimately, among the 423 delegates belonging to the PD, only 342 casted a vote during the 
meeting, but the assembly finally approved the proposal by majority decision, with 222 PD 
delegates voting in favor, 90 opposed and 30 abstentions. 
However, in the first parliamentary ballot held on the subsequent day (18 April), Marini failed to 
pass the threshold and obtained only 521 votes, well below the potential total of delegates (716) 
belonging to the three groups that supported his/her candidacy, i.e., the PD, the center-right 
coalition (People of Freedom and minor allies) and the centrist electoral cartel Civic Choice. The 
secret ballot highlighted tremendous dissent over the nomination of Marini, who received 195 fewer 
votes than expected, and the PD withdrew his/her candidacy. On the fourth ballot, another PD 
candidate, Romano Prodi, witnessed the same fate, and the party, in the midst of a nervous 
breakdown, ultimately decided to support the re-election of Napolitano, who was confirmed 
President on 22 April, on the sixth ballot, by a substantial majority (738 votes). 
The failure of Marini, dismissed by no fewer than 195 rebels, and the subsequent failure of Prodi, 
buried by 101 dissenters, generated heated debate in the media, which began to speculate on the role 
of SNS in promoting intra-party division.  
 
SNS Pressure and Dissent on Marini’s Candidacy 
Dependent Variable 
Studies on party unity usually relies on roll call votes as a direct and observable indicator of 
cohesion. Recently, scholars have also analyzed the propensity for dissent in parliamentary votes of 
individual MPs (Curini, Marangoni, and Tronconi 2011; Sieberer 2015; Tavits 2009). Here we will 
focus on dissent as the dependent variable and we will scrutinize the determinants of the expression 
of public dissent on the candidacy of Marini. To do so, we construct a new dataset that contains 
information on the 423 Democratic Party delegates responsible for selecting the new Head of State. 
PD delegates account for 293 members of the Chamber of Deputies, 105 senators and 25 regional 
delegates. By analyzing this case study, we will be able to assess the impact of SNS by contrasting 
the behaviors of PD delegates while holding country-specific and party-specific factors constant. 
Furthermore, we exploit two peculiarities of the PD that allow us to test our hypotheses: we can 
distinguish MPs selected by the leadership from those selected through primary elections, and we 
can account for the role of intra-party minority factions, which exist within many parties but are 
clearly identifiable and observable within the PD. 
The election of the Head of State is held through secret balloting, a feature typical of Italian politics, 
at least until 1988, when it was eliminated except in certain votes such as this one. Secret voting 
played a crucial role in several key parliamentary votes during the First Italian Republic (1948-
1993), and party factions have typically exploited the secret ballot as a shield to halt unwanted bills 
and to defeat governments, thereby fostering a cabinet reshuffle to alter the distribution of ministers 
among factions (Giannetti 2010). Secret voting, by definition, does not allow us to track the actual 
behavior of MPs. As a consequence, we analyze party dissent by focusing on public declarations of 
MPs, which sometimes can provide more direct insights into legislative decision-making (for a 
similar view: Ecker 2015; Sieberer 2015). Therefore, we measure the propensity to manifest public 
dissent against the candidacy of Marini before the end of the first ballot (April 18
th
). 
This includes MPs who did not vote in favor of Marini during the PD assembly held on 17 April 
(i.e., voted against, abstained or left the room in protest of his selection)
4
 and those who expressed, 
through traditional media (e.g., press releases and interviews) or through social media (Facebook, 
Twitter), their intention to not vote for Marini in the ballot (either by voting for someone else, 
remaining home, or casting a blank vote).
5
 
This task has been facilitated by the fact that several politicians also declared their preferences 
through SNS during the days before the first ballot. For instance, some delegates said, ‘I will vote 
Rodotà’, and others expressed dissent by remarking, ‘I say in a clear and transparent manner that I 
will not vote for Marini’. Conversely, others said ‘I will toe the line, as I usually do in relevant 
parliamentary votes like this’. 
In summary, the dependent variable, Dissent, is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the 
MP expressed public dissent and declared his/her unwillingness to support Marini. Although the 
true vote cast by each politician is unknown (being secret), this variable represents a good proxy for 
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 This assessment is based on the reports published in two different books by politicians from two 
different factions that attended the assembly (Di Traglia and Geloni 2013; Zampa 2013). 
5
 Note that all three of these choices express a degree of dissent (i.e., a lack of support for Marini), 
even when the MP did not appear or cast a blank vote. Analogously, the literature on parliamentary 
cohesion often considers abstentions and unjustified absences as an expression of dissent, 
particularly in the Italian case (Curini and Zucchini 2010). 
it: in our dataset, we detect 158 PD delegates that clearly expressed their intention to defect. The 
total number of defections on the secret ballot was 195, but some of these defections likely came 
from centrist and center-right parties, as several center-right politicians had also declared their 
intention to defect from the agreement. Accordingly, we have been able to provide a nearly 
comprehensive picture of the PD dissenters. 
Notwithstanding any potential link between (visible) public declarations and (unobservable) secret 
behavior, the variable Dissent is even more interesting per se. If compared to the secret ballot, the 
decision to publicly manifest dissent is both more costly, in terms of punishment and potential 
sanctions enacted by the party leadership, and more rewarding, in terms of approval granted by the 
competing principals such as the factional leader, the real constituency of voters or the virtual 
constituency of the users of SNS and Facebook friends. As such, only MPs that explicitly manifest 
dissent will pay the cost associated with this public declaration, but only they can reap the major 
benefits of their defection (e.g., the gratitude of factional leaders and the support of dissenting 
voters and the users of SNS). In this regard, to double check the robustness of our findings, we will 
also consider an additional dependent variable, Explicit Dissent, which represents a subset of the 
previous one. Explicit Dissent is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the MP expressed 
a publicly visible dissent and declared his/her unwillingness to support Marini on traditional media 
or on social media (and not only in the PD Assembly, which was a rather private meeting). Overall, 
147 MPs expressed Explicit Dissent. By considering this additional variable we can more directly 
test our theoretical framework as MPs could gain recognition by their constituents and could claim 
credit for the dissenting behavior only if they publicly communicate it on the media. 
 
Independent Variable 
The main independent variable, used to test H1 and H2, is related to the pressure placed on MPs 
through SNS and the extent of such pressure. To measure SNS pressure, we focused on Facebook 
for a number of reasons. First, the comments published by Facebook users and the Facebook friends 
of politicians are usually publicly available (for those politicians who make their profiles public) or 
can be easily accessed by sending a friend request to the politician, whereas we do not have access 
to private e-mails or SMS messages. Moreover, on Facebook we need, at most, to become the friend 
of a politician to view the public messages sent to him/her, whereas on Twitter observing direct 
messages such as ‘@matteorenzi you should not vote for Marini’ is complicated because we would 
have to be a follower of both the sender and receiver of the message. The tweets sent to politicians 
do not appear on his/her Twitter page.  
It could be argued that the official profile of politicians are managed by their staff and politicians 
may not have been informed of such pressure. For this reason, whenever available, we focused on 
the private Facebook profile of each politician, which is usually managed by himself and not by 
his/her staff. In very few cases the private profile was not available and we reverted to his/her 
public page. Even so, the online pressure and offline demonstrations generated a heated debate, not 
only on social media but also in the media and in the political agenda. Therefore it is very likely that 
each staff has at least informed the politician on the mood of his/her Facebook friends, summarizing 
the degree of pressure put on the Facebook profile. 
The variable FB Pressure has been measured as follows. For each politician, we counted the total 
number of comments posted on his/her Facebook wall that contain an incitement to not vote for 
Marini or suggested to vote for another candidate (e.g., Emma Bonino, Romano Prodi, Stefano 
Rodotà).
6
 For instance, several comments that have been coded as ‘pressure’ criticized the choice of 
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 We focus on the total number of negative comments because we argue that FB pressure could be 
perceived to be stronger by an MP who is highly engaged with his/her audience and receives 1,000 
messages, 300 of which are written to criticize the party line, compared to a less engaged MP who 
Marini by merely saying ‘Marini no!’ or ‘Beware that voters want change, while voting for Marini 
is not a change’ and ‘Please, promise not to support this candidate jointly with the center-right’. 
Other comments asked MPs to support another candidate: ‘Listen to voters: choose Rodotà’ or ‘By 
voting Prodi we can get rid of Berlusconi. Alternatively if voting Prodi is unfeasible vote Rodotà’.7 
Conversely, we did not find comments supporting Marini. 
We considered all comments written between 12 April (one week before the first ballot) and the day 
on which the MP’s choice was observed. This date corresponds to 17 April (at midnight) when the 
PD assembly ended and the MPs were forced to make a choice, while we also considered the 
comments published thereafter for those MPs that were uncertain and openly expressed their 
position only on 18 April.
8
 A total of 5,861 comments were written by Facebook users either to 
criticize Marini (3,810) or in support of someone else (2,051). 
FB Pressure takes the value of zero when the delegate does not have a Facebook profile. This 
operationalization appears reasonable, as the MPs who are not active on Facebook, by definition, 
are not exposed to pressure coming from that social networks. Furthermore, the absence of a 
Facebook profile may also signal that the MP has a rather limited familiarity with Internet and new 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
interacts less with his/her audience and only receives two messages, both written to criticize the 
choice of Marini. Nevertheless, our results also hold when considering the number of comments 
disapproving of the party line weighted by the total number of comments received by the MP (see 
Table 3). 
7
 Note that our results remain unchanged if we consider only the negative comments written against 
Marini and exclude those written to support another candidate. The latter, in fact, could have been 
written also by SNS users belonging to other parties, particularly the Five Stars Movement that 
supported Rodotà (see Table 3). 
8
 Our results hold also when considering only the effect of FB pressure exerted before the PD 
assembly (see Table 3). 
technologies; hence he is likely detached from SNS pressure and less subject to the impact of the 
Internet. 
 
Control Variables 
In addition to SNS pressure, we also account for the role played by more traditional competing 
principals. The Italian electoral system at the time was based on closed-list PR; however, two 
months before the election, the PD organized a party primary to select its candidates. While a 
majority of PD MPs was selected through primary election, not all of them ran in the primary. The 
party leadership decided to select one hundred candidates who were appointed through a type of 
reserved party list. Analogously, the 25 PD regional delegates were indirectly selected by the 
members of the regional councils rather than by the rank-and-file and should therefore be more 
responsive to the party line. To account for this, we create the variable Party Primary, which allows 
us to distinguishing between MPs that ran in the primary election (value one) and those who were 
appointed via the reserved party list or selected by the regional party leadership (value zero), who 
should be more loyal. 
We control for the role of factional affiliation focusing on the Renziani faction, which was the main 
minority faction at that time. The factional leader, Renzi, opposed the candidacy of Marini and this 
is a further rationale for such choice. The variable Minority Faction, therefore, takes the value of 
one when the MP belongs to this faction and the value of zero otherwise.
9
 We assessed factional 
membership based on the expert judgments of two of that faction’s leaders. According to their 
judgment, the share of Renziani delegates (12.3 per cent) closely approximates the number of 
Renziani MPs (13 per cent) as estimated by other external sources (Catone 2013). 
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 Apart from the Renziani, we also considered other dissenting MPs loyal to Pippo Civati, the head 
of a tiny minority faction. This variable however perfectly predicts the outcome. 
The variable Seniority, which records the number of years that each politician had spent in 
parliament, controls for the impact of experience, which should enhance loyalty (e.g. Eggers and 
Spirling 2014). A set of socio-demographic variables like age, gender (using the variable Female 
that takes the value of one for female delegates), and education (using an ordinal variable that 
assesses the delegate’s level of education, ranging from zero for those who only attended primary 
school to five for those who hold a PhD) has been included too. 
Finally, we control for other potential confounding factors. First, we identify the affiliation of each 
MP based on the chamber to which they belong: we include the dummy variables House (equal to 
one for deputies) and Senate (equal to one for senators), with regional delegates being the omitted 
category. Second, we include regional dummies to control for the constituency of each delegate, as 
MPs elected from a given region may decide to dissent or not for peculiar reasons. Third, we 
control for the number of Facebook friends (FB Friends) that each MPs has. On the one hand, 
politicians with a higher number of friends can receive more comments (and therefore also more 
negative comments) than those with a limited number of friends. On the other hand, this measure is 
also a proxy for popularity and allows us to control for the possibility that Facebook users might be 
more willing to contact famous and prominent politicians who can be more influential inside the 
party. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the variables included in the analysis. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Analysis and Results 
We analyze Dissent, which is a binary dependent variable, using logistic regression. To test our 
hypotheses, we estimate four models. In Model 1, we include only the variables directly related the 
competing principals theory. In Model 2, we replicate Model 1 but include all of the controls. In 
Model 3, we test H2 through the interaction between FB Pressure and Party Primary. Finally, in 
Model 4 we replicate Model 2 using Explicit Dissent as a dependent variable. Table 2 displays the 
results. Table 3 provides additional robustness checks by replicating Model 2 using alternative 
operationalizations of the main independent variable (FB Pressure).
10
 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
 
The results suggest no effect of SNS on Dissent (even when we only consider the dissent publicly 
expressed on the media). The coefficient of FB Pressure is never statistically different from zero. 
We can reject H1, as that the pressure exerted by Facebook users did not affect the likelihood that 
an MP would express dissent from the party line. The interaction term involving FB Pressure and 
Party Primary is not statistically significant as well. Therefore, contrary to H2, we do not observe 
differences in the effect of Facebook pressure when we consider delegates selected through party 
primary or selected by the leadership: in both cases such effect is null. 
As such, the public opinion active on SNS does not yet appear to act like a ‘competing principal’, 
and although SNS potentially allow voters and the rank-and-file to exercise their ‘voice’ 
(Hirschman, 1970), there is no guarantee that MPs will heed their requests. 
Conversely, all the traditional ‘competing principals’ seem to matter. First, the electoral rules are 
crucial. The coefficient of Party Primary is positive and statistically significant, indicating that MPs 
selected through primary election are more likely to dissent from the position established by the 
leadership. These MPs are likely to comply with the wishes of another principal, i.e., the rank-and-
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 For clarity reasons the Region dummies are embedded in the models. Their coefficients are 
provided in the online Appendix. 
file members in their local constituency. The coefficient of the variable Minority Faction is also 
consistently positive and statistically significant. Overall, the members of the Renziani faction were 
loyal to their factional leader, Renzi, who behaved as a real competing principal asking them to 
defect from the party line. Seniority has a negative and significant effect on Dissent. Despite the 
secret ballot, the election of the Head of State is a publicly visible, key vote from which voters can 
infer party unity, in the aggregate, by measuring the overall number of defections or the number of 
declarations by MPs who express dissent. In such a crucial event, delegates with greater 
parliamentary experience who have internalized the need for party unity and the mechanisms of 
party loyalty were less likely to express public dissent in an effort to avoid damaging the party. 
Finally, none of the other control variables appears to affect Dissent. In summary, these results 
confirm the findings of the existing literature and extend them from the realm of parliamentary 
voting behavior to that of the public expression of dissent against the party leadership. 
Several robustness checks are provided in Table 3. First, as pressure, we consider only the 
comments that strictly argue against voting for Marini (Model 5). Second, we report a weighted 
measure of FB Pressure, i.e., the number of user comments promoting dissent divided by the total 
number of comments received by the delegate over the same period of time (Model 6). Third 
(Model 7), we measure Dissent and FB Pressure by exclusively focusing on data available before 
the PD assembly (17 April). None of these changes alters our results.
11
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 Notice that, although some variables have a skewed distribution (i.e. FB Pressure, Seniority and 
FB Friends), our results are not driven by this. In fact, when we exclude the ten observations with 
the highest values in one of these variables all the findings hold the same. Data available on request. 
Figure 1, based on Model 1, sheds light on the substantive effects and reports the variation in the 
probability of Dissent when each continuous independent variable increases by one standard 
deviation from its mean, or when each dummy variable changes from 0 to 1 (while all others 
variables are held at their means). The effect of FB Pressure is not statistically different from zero, 
whereas Minority Faction increases the likelihood of Dissent by 68.4 points and Party Primary 
increases it by 20.4 points. Conversely, Dissent is 43.9 points less likely among more experienced 
legislators. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Discussion 
There is an ongoing debate among scholars interested in the relationship between the Internet and 
politics regarding the effect of SNS with respect to accountability, responsiveness and the quality of 
democracy (e.g. Dekker and Bekkers 2015). While some scholars argue that SNS can narrow the 
gap between voters and elected officials, thereby increasing accountability and responsiveness, 
others hold a more skeptical view. The present paper contributes to this literature by analyzing 
12,455 comments posted by the users of SNS on the Facebook walls of Italian MPs to assess 
whether the pressure exerted on SNS played a role in the selection of the Italian Head of State in 
April 2013. This election generated a heated debate on the alleged ability of SNS to act as a 
‘competing principal’ beyond the party leadership. Several journalists and analysts argued that 
voters’ and party activists’ comments published on SNS influenced the behavior of MPs, increasing 
the latter’s likelihood of defecting and sinking Marini’s presidential candidacy. Some of these 
commentators declared that, for the first time, Italy was experiencing the power of Facebook and 
Twitter. Conversely, others de-emphasized the role of SNS and stressed the importance of party 
factionalism and factional loyalties. We solve this puzzle by demonstrating that the pressure exerted 
online by the ‘activated public opinion’ on PD delegates did not influence their propensity to 
express public dissent over the candidacy of Marini. 
Notwithstanding the risk of inflating the SNS effect (due to the huge amount of pressure exerted 
through SNS or because Facebook pressure could be endogenous, if SNS users attempt to influence 
MPs who are already considering the opportunity to defect and just need to be pushed to do that), 
our findings highlight a null impact of Facebook. 
As such, Facebook per se has yet to become a new ‘competing principal’ that politicians must 
address. Our findings represent unwelcome tidings for those optimistic of the potential of the 
Internet. In autocratic regimes SNS can serve a mirror holding function enhancing demands for 
democracy and promoting protests and uprisings (Howard and Parks 2012; Shirky 2011). 
Conversely, the ability of SNS to affect democratic political systems by facilitating the interaction 
between citizens and voters seems, thus far, appears substantially limited, even in a context where 
SNS allowed citizens to voice and exert substantial pressure. 
The results have implications for the role of SNS in enhancing responsiveness and for the 
understanding of the web as a site for participatory e-democracy and deliberation. Although SNS 
theoretically provide room for debate and interaction between citizens and elites (followers and 
leaders), in this case politicians did not feel the need to become responsive to the demands of users 
of SNS. This could have happened also because MPs were just been elected and therefore the need 
to show a responsive behavior towards voters was lower; at the same time, MPs felt that the election 
of the Head of State was a good opportunity to send signals to the leadership in view of the future 
negotiations around the allocation of office payoffs. 
In this regard, our analysis confirms the findings of the literature on party unity, which indicates 
that the political behavior of MPs is still oriented towards the desires of other and more traditional 
principals: the party leadership, the MP’s constituency and the party faction.  
While we can exclude the possibility that SNS played a direct role in hampering the candidacy of 
Marini, we cannot test whether, through hybrid logic (Chadwick 2013), SNS pressure may have 
affected traditional media or off-line citizens’ dissent. Similarly, we did not consider the impact of 
off-line protests and private correspondence/SMS. However, their hypothetical effect should not be 
fully attributable to social media and could be more related to off-line personal contact. 
Nevertheless, future research could improve the present study by investigating the effect of SNS 
across parties and countries and in different environments to evaluate whether social media are 
indeed changing the power relationship between citizens and politicians or, to the contrary, politics 
continue as usual. 
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TABLES 
Table 1 – Descriptive statistics 
Parameters Min Max Mean St. Dev. 
Dissent 0 1 0.374 0.484 
Explicit Dissent 0 1 0.347 0.477 
FB Pressure 0 820 13.856 61.839 
Party Primary 0 1 0.652 0.477 
Minority Faction 0 1 0.123 0.329 
Seniority 0 27 3.423 4.177 
House 0 1 0.693 0.462 
Senate 0 1 0.248 0.432 
FB Friends 0 161221 4840.729 14464.31 
Age 24 90 49.823 10.140 
Female 0 1 0.369 0.483 
Education 0 5 2.867 0.772 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 – Logistic regression of Dissent 
Parameters (1) 
Baseline 
(2) 
Controls 
(3) 
Interaction 
(4) 
Explicit Dissent 
FB Pressure 0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.038  
(0.023) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
Party Primary 0.895*** 
(0.270) 
1.330*** 
(0.401) 
1.519*** 
(0.430) 
0.970** 
(0.377) 
FB Pressure X Party Primary   -0.036 
(0.023) 
 
Minority Faction 4.387*** 
(0.756) 
5.864*** 
(0.993) 
5.942*** 
(1.004) 
4.772*** 
(0.763) 
Seniority -0.117*** 
(0.035) 
-0.173*** 
(0.047) 
-0.181*** 
(0.048) 
-0.130** 
(0.044) 
House  -0.109 
(0.791) 
-0.066  
(0.786) 
0.194 
(0.774) 
Senate  -0.633 
(0.816) 
-0.600 
(0.810) 
-0.351 
(0.793) 
FB Friends  0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000  
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Age  0.002 
(0.017) 
0.003  
(0.017) 
-0.014 
(0.017) 
Female  0.448 
(0.310) 
0.467  
(0.312) 
0.199 
(0.302) 
Education  0.082 
(0.196) 
0.082  
(0.196) 
0.004 
(0.189) 
Constant -1.187*** 
(0.249) 
-1.311 
(1.362) 
-1.588  
(1.384) 
-0.569 
(1.328) 
Dummies per Region NO YES YES YES 
N 423 370 370 370 
% Correctly predicted 74.00 82.16 82.43 80.54 
Area under ROC curve 0.768 0.868 0.871 0.851 
Significance (two tailed): * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 3 – Robustness Checks: Logistic regression of Dissent. 
Parameters (5) (6) (7) 
 Anti-Marini Weighted Pre-Assembly 
Anti-Marini FB Pressure  0.005 
(0.003) 
  
Weighted FB Pressure 
 
1.075 
(0.570) 
 
Pre-Assembly FB Pressure 
  
1.387 
(1.876) 
Party Primary 1.314**  
(0.402) 
1.339*** 
(0.402) 
1.364*** 
(0.400) 
Minority Faction 5.908***  
(1.004) 
5.921*** 
(0.993) 
5.814*** 
(0.980) 
Seniority -0.172***  
(0.047) 
-0.177*** 
(0.048) 
-0.170*** 
(0.048) 
House -0.119  
(0.791) 
-0.073 
(0.788) 
-0.134 
(0.794) 
Senate -0.650 
(0. 817) 
-0.632 
(0.812) 
-0.612  
(0.815) 
FB Friends 0.000  
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000  
(0.000) 
Age 0.002  
(0.017) 
0.008 
(0.018) 
-0.000 
(0.017) 
Female 0.461  
(0.310) 
0.535 
(0.318) 
0.427 
(0.310) 
Education 0.080  
(0.197) 
0.035 
(0.198) 
0.079 
(0.197) 
Constant -1.329  
(1.364) 
-1.823 
(1.415) 
-1.227 
(1.367) 
Dummies per Region YES YES YES 
N 370 370 370 
% Correctly predicted 82.16 82.43 81.89 
Area under ROC curve 0.870 0.872 0.867 
Significance (two tailed): * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Substantive Effects on Dissent. 
 
 
 
 
